By Céline Chevalier, Inria, France and Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, France, celine.chevalier@ens.fr | Paul Hermouet, Inria, France, paul.hermouet@inria.fr | Quoc-Huy Vu, De Vinci Higher Education, France, quoc.huy.vu@ens.fr
The emergence of quantum computing has provided new paradigms for cryptography. On the one hand, it poses significant new threats to existing classically cryptographic systems, requiring the community to define new security models that capture what a quantum adversary can do. On the other hand, it gives us new tools to design cryptographic protocols, with weaker assumptions than in the classical world, or even protocols that are impossible classically.
In this survey, we first give an overview of new security definitions for classical cryptography, considering quantum adversaries who can either only use local quantum computation (post-quantum security), or even send quantum messages and in particular have access to oracle in superposition (quantum security). We explore these new notions through the examples of commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, and signatures. Then, we present what is arguably the most famous application of quantum cryptography: quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that take advantage of unique properties of quantum mechanics to provide secure communication unconditionally. We also explore cryptography beyond QKD, focusing on unclonable cryptography: a family of cryptographic functionalities, built with quantum states, and designed to be resistant to counterfeit by leveraging the “no-cloning” theorem. We examine in particular quantum money, but also the recent notions of unclonable encryption and copy-protection, including related variants.
By presenting a comprehensive survey of these topics, this paper aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current landscape and future potential of quantum cryptography.
The emergence of quantum computing has provided new paradigms for cryptography. On the one hand, it poses significant new threats to existing classically cryptographic systems, requiring the community to define new security models that capture what a quantum adversary can do. On the other hand, it gives us new tools to design cryptographic protocols, with weaker assumptions than in the classical world, or even protocols that are impossible classically.
In this monograph, an overview of new security definitions for classical cryptography is presented, considering quantum adversaries who can either only use local quantum computation (post-quantum security), or even send quantum messages and in particular have access to oracle in superposition (quantum security). These new notions are explored through the examples of commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, and signatures. Then, what is arguably the most famous application of quantum cryptography is presented: quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that take advantage of unique properties of quantum mechanics to provide secure communication unconditionally. Also explored is cryptography beyond QKD, focusing on unclonable cryptography: a family of cryptographic functionalities, built with quantum states, and designed to be resistant to counterfeit by leveraging the “no-cloning” theorem. We examine in particular quantum money, but also the recent notions of unclonable encryption and copy-protection, including related variants. By presenting a comprehensive survey of these topics, this survey aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current landscape and future potential of quantum cryptography.